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PERCOLATING WATERS: THE RULE OF REASON-
ABLE USER.
Is the right to capture and detain percolating waters upon one's
own land an absolute or a qualified right? If it is an absolute
right one need give no excuse or justification for cutting off, even
intentionally or maliciously, another's water supply from subter-
ranean undefined sources. If it is a qualified right one must show
some reasonable end to be served by the exercise of it in order tojustify the damage its exercise inflicts upon a neighbor. To put
the concrete case, may one landowner intentionally (that is, with
foreknowledge of results,) cut off a neighboring landowner's water
supply by thus intercepting, collecting or monopolizing the per-
colating waters that feed the neighbor's well or spring?
The answer given to this question in the leading American case'
is that he may do so if he collects the water for his own use, but
not if he collects it for the sole purpose of injuring the neighbor.
If he collects it for his own use it is immaterial that he also enter-
tains hostility toward the neighbor. The right should not, however,
be exercised from mere malice. Later American cases transfer the
emphasis from the showing of "malice" to a showing of "unreason-
able user" which may or may not be accompanied by malice.
The answer given to this question in the leading English case?
is that he may do so absolutely, since he owns the soil absolutely,
and all that lies therein, whether solid rock, or porous ground, or
venous earth, or part soil, part water, and may dig therein and
apply all that is there found to his own purposes. In a later cases
one judge expressed grave doubts whether this should be extended
to the collecting of water for extensive sale through a large district,
but his doubts were brushed aside. In a quite recent case4 it was
'Greenleaf v. Francis (1836), 18 Pick. 117. See also Roath v. Driscoll,(185o), 20 Conn. 533; Wheatley v. Baugh (1855), 25 Pa. St. 528; Trustees
v. Youmans (1867), 50 Barb. 316; Chesley v. King (1882), 74 Me. 164.
'Acton v. Blundell (1843), 12 Mees. & W. 324. See also Chasemore v.
Richards (1859), 7 H. L. Cas. 349.
'Chasemore v. Richards, supra.
"Mayor of Bradford v. Pickles (1895), A. C. 587.
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held that one owner might lawfully cut off a supply used by a whole
town, with the sole purpose of producing that precise injury, and
with no purpose of benefiting himself or his own lands, or society
in general.
The English law is therefore clear. The landowner who by
operations on his own land cuts off the percolating waters that
would otherwise feed his neighbor's well or spring need make no
defence, need show no justifiable purpose or occasion. His suf-
ficient answer is that he has an absolute right to all the percolating
waters brought or held within his own lands, and can not be called
upon to explain to any one why he has chosen to collect them, or
after collecting them to waste them. Some American cases are
to the same effect.5
It is believed, however, that the prevailing American view is
that, in order to justify the cutting off of another's water supply
derived from percolating waters, it is necessary that this should
be the result of a reasonable user of defendant's rights in his own
lands. To cut off a water supply from mere malice is to cut it
off without reasonable excuse or justification. "The right (to
percolating waters) should not be exercised from mere malice."
"Neither the civil law nor the common law permits a man to be
deprived of a well or spring or stream of water for the mere grati-
fication of malice."7 "This plaintiff had rights in that spring,
which, while they were completely subject to the defendant's right
to consult his own convenience and advantage in the digging of
a well in his own land for the better supply of his own premises
with water, should not be ignored if it were true that defendant
did it 'for the mere, sole and malicious purpose' of cutting off the
sources of the spring and injuring the plaintiff, and not for the
improvement of his own estate." s "An exception exists in case
of an injury done by cutting off such waters with malice. No
person can wantonly and maliciously cut off on his own land the
underground supply of a neighbor's spring or well without any
purpose of usefulness to himself." This is the language of the
'Chatfield v. Wilson, 28 Vt. 49; Wheelock v. Jacobs, 70 Vt. 162; Huber
v. Merkel (Wis., x9o3), 94 N. W. Rep. 354.
'Greenleaf v. Francis, 18 Pick. 117.
"Wheatley v. Baugh, 25 Pa. St. 528. See also Brown v. Kistler (i8gg),
go Pa. St. 499.
'Chesley v. King, 74 Me. 164.
'Trustees v. Youmans, 5o Barb. (N. Y.) 36.
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leading American cases, and, although obiter in the cases above
cited, has been adopted in other cases where the very question was
necessarily decided. There is now a considerable array of authori-
ties holding that the use of percolating waters resulting in harm
to another must be reasonable in order to be justifiable. 0
In the leading New Hampshire case 1 it was held that where
defendant's dam set back water so as to intercept the natural drain-
age (including percolations) from plaintiff's land (although his
land was not situated directly upon the water course), defendant
was liable to plaintiff unless such obstruction was caused by de-
fendant in the reasonable use of his own land or privilege. While
the question arises in a different form, it was thought by the court
to involve the same principles as the cases dealing with the diversion
of percolating waters. Rights in percolating waters are held to
be not absolute, but correlative, and, "from the necessity of the
case, the right of each is only to a reasonable user or management."
In the second New Hampshire case1 2 the same doctrine was applied
to surface water. It is therefore the doctrine in that State that
no difference in theory is to be observed between water in streams,
and percolating or drainage waters. In any case the test is the
reasonableness of the interference with the natural flow or perco-
lation. Malicious interference without benefit to the one interfering
can never be regarded as reasonable.
In the first New York case cited's the action was to recover
damages occasioned by extended operations by wells, acqueducts
and pumps which resulted in drying up plaintiff's brook and pond.
The water so gathered by defendant was conveyed to the city and
then distributed. The court held that the city was making an
unreasonable use of the water. "It may be stated, with some degree
of confidence, that no case will be found in this State, and our
research has not enabled us to find one in any other State of thit
country, where the right has been upheld in the owner of land to
"Bassett v. Salisbury Mfg. Co. (1862), 43 N. H. 569; Swett v'. Clatt
(1870), 50 X. H. 439; Smith v. City of Brooklyn (1897), I8 N. Y. App. Di'v.
340, aff'd i6o N. Y. 357; Forbell v. City of New York (Igoo), z64 N. Y. 522;
Katz v. Walkinshaw (Cal., xgo2), 70 Pac. Rep. 663, on rehearing 74 Pac.
Rep. 766; Stillwater Water Co. v. Farmer (Minn., 9o3), 93 N. W. Rep. 9o7;
Barclay v. Abraham (Iowa, 39o3), 96 N. W. Rep. io8o.
'Bassett v. Salisbury, supra6
12Swett v. Cutts, supra.
"'Smith v. City of Brooklyn, supra. Affirtmed, i6o N. Y. 357.
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destroy a stream, a spring or well upon his neighbor's land, by
cutting off the source of its supply, except it was done in the
exercise of a legal right to improve the land or make some use
of the same in connection with the enjoyment of the land itself,
for purposes of domestic use, agriculture or mining, or by struc-
tures for business carried on upon the premises." This then is
the doctrine that a non-natural user is an unreasonable user.
The second New York case cited1" was one in which the city
water-works operations by collecting all the percolating waters in
the neighborhood dried up plaintiff's land so that it became unfit
for cultivation. It was held that the means (powerful suction
pumps) and the use to which the water was put (conveying it
away for sale) rendered the defendant's acts unreasonable as to
plaintiff. It is true the court called it trespass, but this does not
impair the value of the reasoning by which it was shown that
non-natural means and non-natural user may render the acts of
the defendant in collecting percolating water unreasonable.
15
The California case10 involved a somewhat similar set of facts.
An artesian belt contained several square miles of territory. Plain-
tiff had an artesian well in the belt and used the water for domestic
purposes and for irrigating his lands. Defendant had wells in the
same belt, and was conveying away and selling the water to be
used on lands of others distant from the saturated belt. There
was no evidence of an underground stream; the water was therefore
regarded as percolating water. The operation of defendant's wells
diverted the water to the damage of plaintiff. The court contends
earnestly for the doctrine of reasonable use of percolating waters,
and holds the merchandising of the water by defendant to be
unreasonable as to plaintiff.
The Minnesota case 7 was one in which plaintiff was using the
water to sell to consumers, and defendant diverted a large quantity
of the percolating water, a small part of which he used, but the
greater part of which he turned into the city sewer and wasted.
An injunction was granted against such waste. "Except for the
"Forbell v. City of New York, supra.1 Where plaintiff was also collecting water for a non-natural use and
defendant interfered while collecting water for a like non-natural use, it
was held plaintiff had no remedy. Merrick Water Co. v. Brooklyn, 32 N. Y.
App. Div. 454.
16Katz v. Walkinshaw, supra.
"Stillwater Water Co. v. Farmer, supra.
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benefit and improvement of his own premises, or for his own
beneficial use, the owner of land has no right to drain, collect, or
divert percolating waters thereon, when such acts will destroy or
materially injure the spring of another person, the waters of which
spring are used by the general public for domestic purposes. He must
not drain, collect or divert such waters for the sole purpose of
wasting them." It will be observed that in this case the plaintiff
was making a non-natural use of the water, but defendant was
making no reasonable use whatever.
The Iowa case 8 was also a case of unreasonable waste. Plaintiff
had an artesian well in a saturated belt. Defendant put down a
well and turned the flow into a stream where it was wasted. This
resulted in stopping the flow from plaintiff's well. "The record
indicates strongly that the defendant's object was to maliciously
cut off the water supply of a well-owner other than plaintiff. * * *
A decided tendency to depart from the strict rules of the common
law with respect to percolating waters in the adjustment of modem
conditions is manifest in recent decisions. * * * A landowner may
not collect, drain or divert waters percolating through the earth
merely to carry from his own land for no useful purpose, when
such action on his part will have the effect of materially injuring
or destroying the well or spring of another, the waters of which
are devoted to some beneficial use connected with the land where
found. This applies in principle the doctrine of correlative rights
to the control of subsurface waters whenever the appropriation
proposed is unconnected with the use, enjoyment, or improvement
of the land from which taken."
These cases establish for the jurisdictions concerned the doctrine
of reasonable, user of percolating waters, or of the lands in which
the percolating waters may be collected or diverted. Whether
they place the law of percolating waters upon substantially the
same basis as the law of water courses, as is held in the New
Hampshire cases,19 matters little in the final result. They do
recognize that no one has an absolute right in such waters; that
the right is qualified by the use to which he puts the waters or the
use to which he puts the land in which the waters are; that non-
natural user or mere waste may be an unreasonable use as against
one whose beneficial and reasonable use is thus interfered with.
'Barclay v. Abrahams, supra.
"'Bassett v. Salisbury Mfg. Co., 43 N. H. 569; Swett v. Curtis, .So N. H.
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Assuming the plaintiff is putting the waters to a natural use,
that is one beneficial to the lands or the enjoyment of the lands
where the waters are collected, the defendant may to the damage
of the plaintiff: (i) also put the waters to a like natural and
beneficial use, or, in putting the land itself to a resaonable use, or in
reasonably improving it, incidentally interfere with the percolating
waters; (2) put the waters to a non-natural use, that is a use not
beneficial to the land or its reasonable enjoyment, as where he
pipea the collected water away and sells it; (3) put the water to
no use at all, that is collect the water and merely waste it. In
the first case defendant is not liable to plaintiff for the damage.
20
In the second case defendant has been held to be liable.
21 A fortiori
the defendant is liable in the third case.
22
Assuming the plaintiff is putting the water to a non-natural use,
that is, piping it away and selling it, the defendant may to the
damage of plaintiff: (i) put the water to a natural use beneficial
to the land where collected; (2) put the water to a like non-natural
use by also piping it away and selling it; (3) put the water to no
use whatever, but merely waste it. It would seem clear that de-
fendant would not be liable in the first case, since it has been held
that he would not in the second case.28  In the third case he has
been held to be liable, because, although plaintiff is putting the
water to a use not beneficial to the lands, it is a use beneficial to
society, while defendant is merely wasting it, that is, putting it to
no beneficial use whatever.
24
With the increase in artesian well supplies and the development
of irrigation in arid regions, these questions are likely to become
of even greater importance than they have been in the past. The
American law has now been given a trend that is likely to break
down the old notion that there is an absolute right in percolating
waters and to establish the doctrine of reasonable user, which is,
after all, merely a doctrine of social utility.
Ernest W. Huff cut.
Cornell University College of Law.
"'Tampa Waterworks Co. v. Cline, 37 Fla. 586; Miller v. Black Rock
Springs Imp. Co., 99 Va. 747; Herriman Irrigation Co. v. Kell, 25 Utah 96;
Clark County v. Lumber Co., 8o Miss. 535.
=Forbell v. City of New York, 164 N.. Y. 522; Katz v. Walkinshav
Cal.), 7o Pac. 663; 74 Pac. Rep. 766.
'Barclay v. Abraham (Iowa), 96 N. W. xo8o.
'Merrick Water Co. v. Brooklyn, 32 N. Y. App. Div. 454.
"Stillwater Water Co. v. Farmer (Minn.) 93 N. W. go7.
